IG Report table of contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 1
I. Background.......................................................................................... 1
II. Methodology ........................................................................................ 3
III. Analytical Construct .............................................................................. 5
IV. Structure of the Report.......................................................................... 6
CHAPTER TWO: APPLICABLE LAWS AND DEPARTMENT POLICIES ........................ 9
I. Policies and Laws Governing Criminal Investigations.................................. 9
A. Grand Jury Subpoenas................................................................ 10
B. Search Warrants and 2703(d) Orders ........................................... 10
C. Evidence Collection Related to Attorney-Client Relationships ........... 12
D. Use of Classified Evidence Before A Grand Jury.............................. 13
E. Immunity Agreements................................................................ 13
1. Transactional Immunity..................................................... 13
2. Formal Use Immunity........................................................ 14
3. Letter Immunity and “Queen for a Day” Agreements ............. 14
4. Act of Production Immunity................................................ 15
II. Department Policies and Practices Governing Investigative Activities in
Advance of an Election ........................................................................ 16
A. Election Year Sensitivities Policy .................................................. 16
B. The Unwritten 60-Day Rule ......................................................... 17
III. Public Allegations of Wrongdoing Against Uncharged Individuals and
Disclosure of Information in a Criminal Investigation ............................... 18
A. FBI Media Relations Policy........................................................... 19
B. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 ........................................................................ 20
C. USAM Media Relations Guidance .................................................. 21
IV. Release of Information to Congress....................................................... 22
A. USAM Congressional Relations Guidance....................................... 22
B. FBI Guidance on Information Sharing with Congress ...................... 23
C. Current Department Policy on Communication of Investigative
Information to Congress ............................................................. 23

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1. Policy Memoranda on Department Communications with
Congress ......................................................................... 24
2. The Linder Letter .............................................................. 24
V. Special Counsel Regulations ................................................................. 25
VI. Criminal Statutes Relevant to the Midyear Investigation .......................... 26
A. Mishandling and Retention of Classified Information ....................... 26
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (e) .............................................. 26
2. 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) ............................................................ 29
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1924.............................................................. 34
B. 18 U.S.C. § 2071(a)................................................................... 36
CHAPTER THREE: OVERVIEW OF THE MIDYEAR INVESTIGATION ...................... 37
I. Referral and Opening of the Investigation .............................................. 37
A. Background............................................................................... 37
1. Clinton’s Use of Private Email Servers ................................. 37
2. Production of Emails from the Private Email Servers to the State
Department and Subsequent Deletion of Emails by Clinton’s
Staff ............................................................................... 37
B. State Department Inspector General and IC IG Review of Clinton’s
Emails and Subsequent 811 Referral ............................................ 39
C. FBI’s Decision to Open a Criminal Investigation ............................. 40
D. Initial Briefing for the Department ............................................... 41
II. Staffing the Midyear Investigation......................................................... 42
A. FBI Staffing............................................................................... 42
B. Department Staffing................................................................... 46
III. Role of Senior FBI and Department Leadership in the Investigation........... 47
A. FBI Leadership .......................................................................... 47
B. Department Leadership .............................................................. 50
IV. Investigative Strategy ......................................................................... 54
A. Collection and Examination of Emails that Traversed Clinton’s Servers
and Other Relevant Evidence....................................................... 55
B. Witness Interviews..................................................................... 56
C. Intrusion Analysis ...................................................................... 57
CHAPTER FOUR: DECISION TO PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE MIDYEAR
INVESTIGATION AND REACTION TO WHITE HOUSE STATEMENTS ABOUT THE
INVESTIGATION ................................................................................. 59

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I. Public Acknowledgement of the Investigation ......................................... 59
A. Statements about the Investigation in Department and FBI Letters to
Congress in August and September 2015...................................... 59
B. September 28, 2015 Meeting between Attorney General Lynch and
Director Comey ......................................................................... 60
1. Comey’s Account of the Meeting ......................................... 60
2. Lynch’s Recollection of the Meeting ..................................... 61
3. Toscas’s Notes and Recollection of the Meeting..................... 64
C. October 1, 2015 Comey Meeting with Media.................................. 65
II. Reaction to White House Statements about the Midyear Investigation ....... 66
CHAPTER FIVE: INVESTIGATIVE METHODS USED IN THE INVESTIGATION......... 71
I. FBI’s Efforts to Identify and Review Relevant Sources of Evidence ............ 71
II. The Midyear Team’s Efforts to Understand and Access Clinton’s Servers .... 76
III. Use of Criminal Process to Obtain Documentary and Digital Evidence ........ 79
IV. Use of Consent to Obtain Physical Evidence............................................ 81
A. Debate over the Use of Consent................................................... 81
B. Limits of Consent Agreements ..................................................... 85
V. Efforts to Obtain Email Content from the Private Accounts of Clinton’s Senior
Aides................................................................................................. 88
A. Section 2703(d) Orders for Non-Content Information for Mills’s and
Abedin’s Private Email Accounts................................................... 90
B. Decisions Regarding Search Warrants for Private Email Accounts ..... 91
C. Access to Personal Devices for Clinton’s Senior Aides ..................... 92
D. Review of Abedin’s Emails on the Clinton Server ............................ 95
E. Decision Not to Seek Access to Certain Highly Classified Information 96
VI. Voluntary Interviews ........................................................................... 97
VII. Use Immunity Agreements................................................................... 99
A. Pagliano ................................................................................... 99
B. Combetta.................................................................................102
C. Bentel .....................................................................................108
VIII. Use of Consent and Act of Production Immunity to Obtain Mills and
Samuelson Testimony and Laptops ......................................................109
A. Privilege Claims Raised by Mills and Samuelson ............................109

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B. Debate over Interviewing Mills and Samuelson Regarding the Culling
Process and Obtaining the Culling Laptops ...................................110
C. Events Leading to Voluntary Interviews of Mills and Samuelson
Regarding the Culling Process.....................................................112
1. Attorney Proffer on March 19, 2016 ...................................112
2. Midyear Team Meeting on March 28, 2016 ..........................113
3. FBI Call to Wilkinson on April 8 About Mills and Samuelson
Interviews Without Informing Prosecutors...........................114
4. FBI Surprise Statement at Outset of April 9 Mills Interview ...115
5. Mills and Samuelson Agree to Voluntary Interviews Regarding
the Culling Process...........................................................116
D. Steps Taken to Obtain and Search the Culling Laptops ..................118
1. Internal Strategizing and Call with Clinton’s Counsel ............118
2. Approval to Subpoena the Culling Laptops ..........................119
3. Act of Production Immunity for Mills and Samuelson ............120
4. Limitations in the Consents to Search the Culling Laptops .....122
5. Review of the Laptops ......................................................125
E. Involvement of Senior Department and FBI Officials......................125
F. Motivations behind the Culling Testimony and Laptop Dispute ........128
IX. Interview of Former Secretary Clinton ..................................................129
A. Decision to Conduct Clinton’s Interview Last.................................130
B. Number of People Attending (“Loaded for Bear” Text Message).......130
C. Conduct of Clinton’s Interview ....................................................134
D. Decision to Allow Mills and Samuelson to Attend Clinton Interview ..138
E. Consideration of Subpoenaing Clinton before the Grand Jury..........139
X. FBI Inspection Division Internal File Review of the Midyear Investigation ..141
XI. Instant Messages Relating to the Conduct of the Midyear Investigation.....144
XII. Analysis of Investigative Decisions .......................................................148
A. Preference for Consent Rather than Compulsory Process to Obtain
Evidence..................................................................................150
B. Decisions Not to Obtain or Seek to Review Certain Evidence...........152
C. Voluntary Interviews .................................................................154
D. Use Immunity Agreements.........................................................155
E. Mills and Samuelson..................................................................157
F. Handling of Clinton’s Interview ...................................................160

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CHAPTER SIX: “ENDGAME” DISCUSSIONS AND FORMER DIRECTOR COMEY’S
PUBLIC STATEMENT ...........................................................................163
I. Evidence that the Case Was Headed toward a Declination .......................163
II. Discussions between FBI and Department Leadership about How to Credibly
Announce a Declination (Spring 2016) ..................................................167
A. Initial Discussion between Comey and Yates in April 2016..............168
1. Options Discussed at the Meeting ......................................168
2. Comey Mentions a Special Counsel at April Meeting with
Yates .............................................................................170
3. Lynch’s Knowledge of the April Meeting ..............................174
B. Subsequent Discussions Between Comey and Yates ......................175
C. Other Discussions within the FBI and Department.........................177
1. Discussions between McCabe and Carlin .............................177
2. Discussions among Prosecutors and NSD Supervisors...........178
3. Additional Special Counsel Discussions ...............................180
4. NSD Notes Reflecting Plans for an Announcement................181
III. Drafting of Former Director Comey’s Public Statement............................185
A. Original Draft Statement............................................................185
B. The Decision to Omit “Gross Negligence” .....................................191
C. Comey’s Edits to the Statement..................................................194
D. FBI Analysis of Legal and Policy Issues Implicated by the Draft
Statement................................................................................197
E. Concerns about a Public Statement.............................................200
F. Comey’s Decision Not to Inform the Department ..........................201
IV. June 27, 2016 Tarmac Meeting and Aftermath.......................................202
A. Meeting between Lynch and Former President Clinton ...................202
1. How the Meeting Came About ...........................................202
2. Discussion between Former President Clinton and Lynch.......205
3. Intervention by Lynch’s Staff.............................................209
B. Responding to Media Questions about the Tarmac Meeting.............211
C. Discussions about Possible Recusal .............................................214
1. Departmental Ethics Opinion .............................................214
2. Discussions about Voluntary Recusal..................................214
D. Lynch’s July 1 Aspen Institute Statement.....................................217
E. Impact of the Tarmac Meeting on Comey’s Decision to Make a Public
Statement................................................................................219

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V. July 5, 2016 Press Conference.............................................................221
A. Notifications to Department Leadership .......................................221
1. Call to Yates....................................................................223
2. Call to Lynch ...................................................................224
3. Notifications to NSD .........................................................225
B. Reactions to the Statement........................................................226
1. Department and NSD Leadership .......................................226
2. Prosecutors.....................................................................232
VI. Congressional Testimony Explaining the July 5 Statement.......................233
A. July 7, 2016 .............................................................................233
B. September 28, 2016 .................................................................235
C. June 8, 2017............................................................................235
VII. Analysis ............................................................................................238
A. Comey’s Decision to Make a Unilateral Announcement...................239
B. Content of Comey’s Unilateral Announcement...............................245
C. Lynch’s Decision Not to Recuse after the Tarmac Meeting ..............249
D. Lynch’s Response to Comey’s Notification ....................................250
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE DEPARTMENT’S DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE..............253
I. The Declination Recommendation ........................................................253
II. The Attorney General Briefing..............................................................258
III. Analysis ............................................................................................260
CHAPTER EIGHT: OCTOBER EFFORTS BY FBI LEADERSHIP TO RESPOND TO
CRITICISM OF THE MIDYEAR INVESTIGATION.......................................265
I. SAC Conference (October 11 to 14)......................................................265
II. Midyear Talking Points Distributed to FBI Field Offices (October 21) .........266
III. Midyear Briefing for Retired FBI Special Agents (October 21)...................267
IV. FBI Office of Public Affairs Research Project (October 14 to 31) ...............269
V. FOIA and Congressional Requests in October.........................................271
CHAPTER NINE: DISCOVERY OF CLINTON EMAILS ON THE WEINER LAPTOP AND
REACTIVATION OF THE MIDYEAR INVESTIGATION.................................273
I. Discovery of Emails by the FBI’s New York Field Office............................273

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A. Seizure of Weiner Laptop and Devices .........................................273
B. Emails and BlackBerry PIN Message Viewed by Case Agent............273
C. Reporting of Clinton-Related Emails to FBI NYO Supervisors...........274
D. Reporting of Clinton-Related Emails to SDNY................................276
II. Reporting of Clinton-Related Emails to FBI Headquarters ........................277
A. AD Secure Video Teleconference on September 28........................277
B. McCabe Post-SVTC Phone Call and Meeting on September 28.........278
1. Phone Call with Sweeney ..................................................278
2. Meeting with Strzok and Priestap.......................................279
C. Comey and McCabe Communications After AD SVTC on September
28...........................................................................................280
D. Sweeney Calls Other FBI Executives on September 28 ..................282
1. Criminal EAD Coleman......................................................283
2. National Security EAD Steinbach........................................283
3. Counterintelligence AD Priestap .........................................284
III. Initial Response of FBI Headquarters to Discovery of Midyear-Related
Information on the Weiner Laptop........................................................284
A. Phone Call between Sweeney and Priestap on September 29..........284
B. Conference Call between NYO and Midyear Personnel on September
29...........................................................................................285
1. Testimony and Contemporaneous Notes from Call
Participants.....................................................................286
2. Post-Call NYO Communications..........................................288
3. Post-Call Midyear Team and FBI Headquarters Response ......288
C. McCabe Call to NSD Leadership on October 3 ...............................291
D. FBI Headquarters Discussions on October 3 and 4.........................292
1. EAD Coleman October 3 Meeting with Baker and Bowdich.....292
2. Email from Bowdich to Comey on October 3........................293
3. Meeting between Comey and Coleman on October 4 ............293
IV. NYO Completes Processing of Weiner Laptop Around October 4 ...............295
V. FBI Headquarters Inaction and Explanations for the Delay ......................295
A. Delays in Processing the Weiner Laptop.......................................296
B. Prioritization of Weiner Laptop and Russia Investigation ................296
C. Lack of Specific Information .......................................................299
D. Questions About Legal Authority .................................................300
E. Strzok Timeline ........................................................................300

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VI. Concerns of Weiner Case Agent and Conversation with SDNY AUSAs on
October 19........................................................................................302
VII. SDNY Response to Weiner Case Agent Concerns ....................................304
A. SDNY Internal Discussions on October 20 ....................................304
B. SDNY Calls to ODAG and NSD on October 21................................304
C. SDNY Memo on October 21 ........................................................306
VIII. DOJ and FBI Response to SDNY Notification ..........................................307
A. Prosecutor 1-Strzok Call on October 21 .......................................307
B. FBI Leadership Knowledge of SDNY Notification on October 21 .......308
C. Toscas Asks McCabe About Weiner Laptop on October 24 ..............309
D. Call between McCabe, Sweeney, and NYO Criminal SAC on October
24...........................................................................................311
IX. Reengagement of FBI Headquarters and the Midyear Team on the Weiner
Laptop..............................................................................................311
A. McCabe Phone Call with McCord on October 25.............................311
B. Comey, McCabe, and Sweeney Discuss the Weiner Laptop on October
25...........................................................................................312
C. Midyear Team Emails on October 25 ...........................................313
X. Events Leading to the Decision to Seek a Search Warrant.......................314
A. Midyear-NYO-SDNY Call on October 26........................................315
B. Briefing of McCabe on October 26 ...............................................317
C. McCabe Recollection of Discussion with Comey on October 26 ........319
D. McCabe Email to Comey on October 27 .......................................320
E. Midyear Team Communications Preceding Comey Briefing on October
27...........................................................................................321
F. Comey Briefing on October 27....................................................322
XI. Analysis ............................................................................................324
A. Failure of the FBI to Take Earlier Action on the Weiner Laptop........324
B. Decision to Seek Search Warrant on October 27 ...........................330
CHAPTER TEN: THE DECISION TO NOTIFY CONGRESS ON OCTOBER 28 ...........333
I. Factors Considered as Part of Comey’s Decision to Notify Congress ..........333
A. Belief That Failure to Disclose Would Be an Act of Concealment......333
B. Perceived Obligation to Update Congress .....................................334

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C. Avoiding the Perception that the FBI Concealed the New Information to
Help Clinton Win the Election......................................................337
1. Protecting the Reputation of the FBI...................................338
2. Protecting the Legitimacy of a Clinton Presidency.................339
D. Concerns about the Electoral Impact of the Announcement............339
E. Expectation that Clinton Would Be Elected President .....................342
F. Belief that Email Review Could Not Be Completed Before the
Election ...................................................................................343
G. Fear that the Information Would Be Leaked .................................345
II. Comparison to Other Ongoing Investigations.........................................346
A. The Differential Treatment of the Russia Investigation...................346
B. The Differential Treatment of the Clinton Foundation Investigation..348
III. Internal FBI Discussions Regarding the Decision to Notify Congress .........349
A. McCabe, Strzok, and Page Text Messages on October 27 ...............349
B. Strzok Call with Midyear SSA, Agent 1, and Agent 2 on October 28.350
C. Agent 1’s Instant Messages on October 28...................................351
IV. The FBI Informs DOJ Leadership About Comey’s Decision .......................352
A. FBI and DOJ Midyear Team Discussions .......................................352
B. Department and FBI Leadership Discussions ................................355
1. Comey’s Decision Not to Engage Directly with Lynch or Yates356
2. Phone Calls between Rybicki and Axelrod............................356
3. Internal Department Discussions .......................................359
4. Decision Not to Order Comey to Stand Down.......................360
5. Decision Not to Engage Directly with Comey .......................363
6. Comey’s Reaction to the Department’s Response.................364
V. Finalizing the FBI’s October 28, 2016 Letter to Congress.........................366
A. October 28, 2016 Letter to Congress...........................................366
B. Drafting the Letter and Key Edits ................................................366
1. “Appear to be Pertinent” ...................................................367
2. “Briefed Me On This Yesterday” .........................................368
3. Discussions About Letter With the Department ....................369
4. Comey Email to All FBI Employees .....................................370
VI. Analysis of the Decision to Send the October 28 Letter ...........................371
A. Substantive Assessment of Comey’s Decision ...............................371
1. FBI and Department Norms and Policies .............................371
2. Comey’s Justification for Departing ....................................372

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3. Comey’s Comparison of Risks and Outcomes.......................374
4. Fear of Leaks ..................................................................376
B. Lack of Communication Between Comey and Department
Leadership ...............................................................................376
CHAPTER ELEVEN: COMPLETION OF THE INVESTIGATION...............................379
I. The October 30, 2016 Search Warrant..................................................379
A. Decision Not to Seek Consent from Abedin and Weiner before Seeking
a Warrant ................................................................................379
B. Factual Basis of the October 30 Search Warrant Application ...........380
C. Difference in Approach to Devices during Main Investigation ..........382
II. Lynch-Comey Meeting on October 31 ...................................................384
III. FBI Review of Weiner Laptop Emails.....................................................388
IV. Agent 1 Instant Messages from November 1 .........................................390
V. Comey Letter to Congress on November 6 ............................................390
CHAPTER TWELVE: TEXT MESSAGES, INSTANT MESSAGES, USE OF PERSONAL
EMAIL, AND ALLEGED IMPROPER DISCLOSURES OF NON-PUBLIC
INFORMATION...................................................................................395
I. Text Messages and Instant Messages ...................................................395
A. Text Messages between Lisa Page and Peter Strzok ......................396
1. Text Messages Commenting on Trump or Clinton.................399
2. Text Messages Discussing Political Sentiments and the Midyear
Investigation...................................................................401
3. Text Messages Discussing Political Sentiments and the Russia
Investigation...................................................................403
4. Other Notable Text Messages ............................................407
B. Instant Messages between Agent 1 and Agent 5 ...........................410
1. Instant Messages Referencing the Midyear Investigation.......410
2. Instant Messages Commenting on Trump or Clinton.............412
C. FBI Attorney 2 Instant Messages ................................................415
D. Analysis...................................................................................420
II. Use of Personal Email .........................................................................424
A. Comey.....................................................................................425
B. Strzok and Page .......................................................................426

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III. Allegations that Department and FBI Employees Improperly Disclosed Non-
Public Information..............................................................................428
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: WHETHER FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR ANDREW MCCABE
SHOULD HAVE RECUSED FROM CERTAIN MATTERS................................431
I. Introduction ......................................................................................431
II. Timeline of Key Events .......................................................................431
III. Relevant Standards and Procedures .....................................................432
A. Financial Conflict of Interest Statute............................................432
B. Executive Branch Regulations Addressing Appearance Concerns and
Impartiality in Performing Official Duties......................................433
C. Department of Justice Regulation Requiring Disqualification Arising
from Personal or Political Relationships ........................................435
D. What Constitutes “Participation” Under the Regulations .................436
E. FBI Procedures and Ethics Officials..............................................436
IV. Factual Findings.................................................................................437
A. Background Facts .....................................................................437
1. Andrew McCabe...............................................................437
2. FBI Clinton Investigations .................................................438
3. Dr. McCabe Meets Governor McAuliffe in February 2014 .......438
4. Recruitment to Run for Virginia State Senate in February
2015 ..............................................................................438
5. The McCabes’ Meeting with Governor McAuliffe in March
2015 ..............................................................................438
6. Dr. McCabe’s Campaign....................................................440
B. McCabe Discusses Wife’s Candidacy with FBI Officials, Seeks Ethics
Advice, and Recuses from Various FBI Investigations ....................441
1. Meeting with Comey’s Chief of Staff; Extent of Director Comey’s
Knowledge or Approval.....................................................441
2. Conversation with Deputy Director Giuliano.........................442
3. Meeting with Acting Chief Division Counsel on March 10 .......442
4. Meeting with Kelley and Baker on March 11 ........................443
5. McCabe Recusal EC Issued on April 29................................444
C. No Reassessment of Conflict/Recusal when McCabe becomes ADD or
after Dr. McCabe Loses Election..................................................445
D. Participation in Clinton Email and Clinton Foundation Investigations 445
1. McCabe Not Recused as ADIC, ADD, or DD .........................445
2. Recusal Concerns Related to Clintons Raised in May 2015 when
McCabe is ADIC...............................................................446

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E. Clinton Email and Clinton Foundation Investigations Recusals.........448
1. October 23, 2016 Wall Street Journal Article .......................448
2. Internal Deliberations and Recusals from Clinton Email and
Clinton Foundation Investigations ......................................449
3. Participation in Clinton Foundation Investigation after November
1 ...................................................................................454
F. Decision Not to Disclose McCabe’s Recusals to Congress ................455
V. OIG Analysis .....................................................................................456
A. Recusal Issues..........................................................................456
1. Summary of Findings .......................................................456
2. Recusal from Clinton-Related Investigations........................457
B. Conclusion ...............................................................................460
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: WHETHER FORMER ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
PETER J. KADZIK SHOULD HAVE RECUSED FROM CERTAIN MATTERS.......461
I. Introduction ......................................................................................461
II. Timeline of Key Events .......................................................................462
III. Relevant Standards ............................................................................463
A. Personal and Business Relationships Creating an Appearance of a
Conflict 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 ......................................................464
B. Use of Non-public Information 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703.......................464
C. Use of Public Office for Private Gain 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702 ...............464
IV. Factual Findings.................................................................................464
A. Background..............................................................................464
1. Peter J. Kadzik ................................................................464
2. John D. Podesta, Jr. .........................................................465
3. Office of Legislative Affairs................................................465
4. Ethics Training and Obligations..........................................466
5. Kadzik’s Recusals.............................................................466
B. Events Preceding the “Heads Up” Email from Kadzik to Podesta (March
through May 2015) ...................................................................467
1. OLA Clinton-Related Work.................................................467
2. 2016 Clinton Campaign Staffed and Announced...................469
3. Kadzik Assists Son’s Job Search.........................................469
4. Kadzik’s Son Separately Seeks Employment with the Clinton
Campaign .......................................................................470
5. Kadzik Gives Podesta a “Heads Up”....................................470
C. Kadzik’s Subsequent OLA Work Related to or Referencing Clinton ...471

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D. Response to WikiLeaks Release ..................................................473
E. Kadzik Is Recused.....................................................................474
V. Analysis ............................................................................................476
A. Whether Kadzik Should Have Been Recused Prior to November 2 from
Clinton-Related Matters under Section 502 of the Standards of Ethical
Conduct...................................................................................476
1. Whether There Was a Particular Matter Involving Specific
Parties............................................................................476
2. Whether Kadzik Should Have Recused Because of his Son’s
Efforts to Obtain Employment with the Clinton Campaign .....477
3. Whether Kadzik Should Have Recused from Clinton-Related
Matters in May 2015 by Reason of Sending the “Heads Up”
Email to Podesta..............................................................479
B. Whether Kadzik Violated the Terms of his Recusal after November 2,
2016 .......................................................................................481
C. Whether Kadzik Improperly Used Non-Public information in Violation of
the Standards of Ethical Conduct ................................................482
D. Whether Kadzik Misused His Public Office for Private Gain in Violation
of the Standards of Ethical Conduct.............................................483
CHAPTER FIFTEEN: FBI RECORDS VAULT TWITTER ANNOUNCEMENTS .............485
I. Introduction ......................................................................................485
II. Background.......................................................................................486
A. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.................................486
B. The FBI FOIA Process ................................................................488
1. Records/Information Dissemination Section’s FOIA Process...488
2. Release of FOIA Documents on the FBI Vault ......................490
III. Findings............................................................................................490
A. Facts .......................................................................................490
1. Timeline .........................................................................490
2. Detailed Chronology.........................................................491
B. Analysis...................................................................................495
CHAPTER SIXTEEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .........................497
I. Conclusions.......................................................................................497
II. Recommendations..............................................................................499

Stanley Goldfoot

Stanley Goldfoot
“In 2006, at the age of 92, Stanley Goldfoot passed away. Stanley Goldfoot was born in Johannesburg, South Africa. In 1932, at the age of 18, he headed for Palestine where he joined a HaShomer HaTzair kibbutz. After the rebirth of the Jewish State of Israel his main goal, which he eventually realized, was to establish a Zionist English newspaper, “The Times of Israel.” In the first issue of “The Times of Israel”, in 1969, Goldfoot wrote his famous “Letter to the World from Jerusalem.” The article is still remarkably relevant, so I thought I’d share it with you. It’s the thoughts of only one man but, as I read it, it occurred to me that, in many ways, it represents the pleas of an entire nation – a people with one small desire: “to be a free people in our land”.






Here is the Full Text: Stanley Goldfoot

“I am not a creature from another planet, as you seem to believe. I am >> a Jerusalemite-like yourselves, a man of flesh and blood. I am a citizen of my city, an integral part of my people. I have a few things to get off my chest. Because I am not a diplomat, I do not have to mince words. I do not have to please you or even persuade you.

I owe you nothing. You did not build this city, you did not live in it, you did not defend it when they came to destroy it. And we will be damned if we will let you take it away. There was a Jerusalem before there was a New York . When Berlin , Moscow , London , and Paris were miasmal forest and swamp, there was a thriving Jewish community here. It gave something to the world which you nations have rejected ever since you established yourselves- a humane moral code.

Here the prophets walked, their words flashing like forked lightning. Here a people who wanted nothing more than to be left alone, fought off waves of heathen would-be conquerors, bled and died on the battlements, hurled themselves into the flames of their burning Temple rather than surrender, and when finally overwhelmed by sheer numbers and led away into captivity, swore that before they forgot Jerusalem, they would see their tongues cleave to their palates, their right arms whither.

For two pain-filled millennia, while we were your unwelcome guests, we prayed daily to return to this city. Three times a day we petitioned the Almighty: “Gather us from the four corners of the world, bring us upright to our land, return in mercy to Jerusalem, Thy city, and swell in it as Thou promised.” On every Yom Kippur and Passover, we fervently voiced the hope that next year would find us in Jerusalem.

Your inquisitions, pogroms, expulsions, the ghettos into which you jammed us, your forced baptisms, your quota systems, your genteel anti-Semitism, and the final unspeakable horror, the holocaust (and worse, your terrifying disinterest in it)- all these have not broken us. They may have sapped what little moral strength you still possessed, but they forged us into steel. Do you think that you can break us now after all we have been through? Do you really believe that after Dachau and Auschwitz we are frightened by your threats of blockades and sanctions? We have been to Hell and back- a Hell of your making. What more could you possibly have in your arsenal that could scare us?

I have watched this city bombarded twice by nations calling themselves civilized. In 1948, while you looked on apathetically, I saw women and children blown to smithereens, after we agreed to your request to internationalize the city. It was a deadly combination that did the job- British officers, Arab gunners, and American-made cannon. And then the savage sacking of the Old City-the willful slaughter, the wanton destruction of every synagogue and religious school, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries, the sale by a ghoulish government of tombstones for building materials, for poultry runs, army camps, even latrines.

And you never said a word.

You never breathed the slightest protest when the Jordanians shut off the holiest of our places, the Western Wall, in violation of the pledges they had made after the war- a war they waged, incidentally, against the decision of the UN. Not a murmur came from you whenever the legionnaires in their spiked helmets casually opened fire upon our citizens from behind the walls.

Your hearts bled when Berlin came under siege. You rushed your airlift ‘to save the gallant Berliners’. But you did not send one ounce of food when Jews starved in besieged Jerusalem . You thundered against the wall which the East Germans ran through the middle of the German capital- but not one peep out of you about that other wall, the one that tore through the heart of Jerusalem . And when that same thing happened 20 years later, and the Arabs unleashed a savage, unprovoked bombardment of the Holy City again, did any of you do anything?

The only time you came to life was when the city was at last reunited. Then you wrung your hands and spoke loftily of ‘justice’ and need for the ‘Christian’ quality of turning the other cheek.

The truth- and you know it deep inside your gut – you would prefer the city to be destroyed rather than have it governed by Jews. No matter how diplomatically you phrase it, the age old prejudices seep out of every word.

If our return to the city has tied your theology in knots, perhaps you had better reexamine your catechisms. After what we have been through, we are not passively going to accommodate ourselves to the twisted idea that we are to suffer eternal homelessness until we accept your savior.

For the first time since the year 70, there is now complete religious freedom for all in Jerusalem. For the first time since the Romans put a torch to the Temple, everyone has equal rights (You prefer to have some more equal than others.) We loathe the sword- but it was you who forced us to take it up. We crave peace, but we are not going back to the peace of 1948 as you would like us to.

We are home. It has a lovely sound for a nation you have willed to wander over the face of the globe. We are not leaving. We are redeeming the pledge made by our forefathers: Jerusalem is being rebuilt. ‘Next year’ and the year after, and after, and after, until the end of time- ‘in Jerusalem ‘!”

Stanley Goldfoot